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Summary
On May 24, 2002, President Bush and Russia’s President Putin signed a new
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (known as the Treaty of Moscow) that will
reduce strategic nuclear weapons to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads by December
31, 2012.  Russia entered the negotiations seeking a “legally binding document” that
would contain limits, definitions, counting rules and elimination rules that resembled
those in the START Treaties.  Russia also wanted the new Treaty to contain a
statement noting U.S. missile defenses would not undermine the effectiveness of
Russia’s offensive forces.  The United States preferred a less formal process in which
the two nations would state their intentions to reduce their nuclear forces, possibly
accompanied by a document outlining added monitoring and transparency measures.
Furthermore, the United States had no intention of including restrictions on missile
defenses in an agreement outlining reductions in strategic offensive nuclear weapons.
Russia convinced the United States to sign a legally binding treaty, but the
United States rejected any limits and counting rules that would require the
elimination of delivery vehicles and warheads removed from service.  It wanted the
flexibility to reduce its forces at its own pace, and to restore warheads to deployed
forces if conditions warranted.  The Treaty contains four substantive Articles.  The
first limits each side to 1,700-2,200 strategic nuclear warheads, but states that the
parties can determine the structure of their forces themselves.  The second states that
START I remains in force; the parties can use that Treaty’s verification regime to
monitor reductions under the new Treaty.  The third established a bilateral
implementation commission and the fourth sets December 31, 2012, for the Treaty’s
expiration and notes that either party can withdraw on three months notice.
Under the new Treaty, the United States is likely to retain the same force
structure planned for START II, which would have limited each side to 3,500
warheads.  But the United States will remove additional warheads from deployed
forces and leave out of its tally warheads that could be deployed on systems in
overhaul or assigned to conventional missions.  Russia is likely to eliminate many of
its existing ballistic missiles and submarines, retaining perhaps a few hundred
multiple warhead ICBMs and fewer than 10 ballistic missile submarines.
Russian officials have hailed the success of Russia’s diplomacy in convincing
the United States to sign a legally binding Treaty that casts Russia as an equal partner
in the arms control process.  The United States, however, maintained its ability to set
its force structure according to its own needs, and avoided any limits on stored
warheads or missile defenses.  Most observers in the United States and Russia have
praised the Treaty as a useful step in the arms control process.  Some, however, have
argued that the Treaty could raise new risks if the warheads placed in storage become
targets for terrorists or others who would seek to steal or sell them.  The Treaty’s
ratification was approved by the U.S. Senate on March 6, 2003, and the Russian
Duma on May 14, 2003.
This report will be updated when events warrant.
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1 Officially, the Treaty is titled “Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions” in English and
“Agreement on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Potentials” in Russian.  The two sides
were unable to agree on a single name.  The United States reportedly did not want to include
the word “arms” in the title, as the subject of the reductions, because this would imply that,
like the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), the new treaty would require the actual
elimination of weapons.  But, the Russian language required a noun as the subject of the
reductions.  Hence, the Russian title refers to the reduction of “potentials.”  See Michael
Wines, "Treaty of What’s Its Name,"  New York Times, May 23, 2002.
2 As is discussed below, the parties did not define this term.
3 The START I Treaty, which was fully implemented in late 2001, limits the United States
and Russia to 6,000 “accountable” warheads on their strategic offensive delivery vehicles.
However, because START I does not include many bomber weapons in its tally, the United
States can deploy around 7,100 warheads on its existing nuclear forces structure.  Russia,
with fewer bomber weapons in its force, has closer to 6,000 weapons.
Nuclear Arms Control:
The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty
On May 24, 2002, President Bush and Russia’s President Putin signed a new
Treaty, known as the Treaty of Moscow, that would limit strategic offensive nuclear
weapons.1  In it, the two nations state that they will reduce strategic nuclear weapons2
to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads by December 31, 2012.  Press reports and
public statements have hailed this agreement as a sharp reduction from current levels
of around 6,000 warheads.3  However, this new treaty differs from past arms control
treaties in that it does not include any of the detailed definitions, counting rules,
elimination procedures, or monitoring and verification provisions that have become
common in treaties signed since the late 1980s.  Consequently, a simple comparison
of warhead levels counted under START I and warhead levels permitted by the new
Treaty does not provide a complete view of the likely effects of the new Treaty. 
This report provides a brief overview of the two nations’ objectives when they
began discussions on this treaty and a summary of how they resolved these
differences when concluding the negotiations. It then describes the key provisions in
the Treaty and presents illustrative forces that each side might deploy in the next 10
years.  It offers a brief assessment of how each nation fared in achieving its
objectives when negotiating this agreement and a summary of reaction from U.S. and
Russian commentators.  It concludes with a brief review of the issues raised during
the Treaty’s ratification debates.
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4 White House, Office of the Press Secretary. Joint Statement by US President George W.
Bush and President of the Russian Federation Vladimir V. Putin on Upcoming Consultations
on Strategic Issues.  Genoa, Italy, July 22, 2001. 
5 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary.  Press Conference. President Bush and
President Putin Discuss New Relationship.  November 13, 2001.
6 Ibid.
Background
The first signs of a new arms control dialogue between the United States and
Russia appeared after President Bush and President Putin met in Genoa, Italy, during
the G-8 summit in July 2001.  At that time, the Presidents issued a statement saying
that the two nations would  “shortly begin intensive consultations on the interrelated
subjects of offensive and defensive systems.”4  Each nation had sharply divergent
views on the substance and goals for these talks.  When discussing offensive force
reductions, Russia argued that the two sides should seek agreement on a formal treaty
that would limit each side to 1,500 nuclear weapons.  The Bush Administration
wanted to pursue unilateral reductions, with each side setting its own nuclear force
size and structure, but it would not offer any details on U.S. plans in this regard until
the Department of Defense completed its review of U.S. nuclear posture.  This
internal review apparently concluded in November, 2001.
During a summit meeting with President Putin in Washington, on November 13,
2001, President Bush announced that the United States would reduce its
“operationally deployed” strategic nuclear warheads to a level between 1,700 and
2,200 over the next decade.”  The President stated that the United States would
reduce its forces unilaterally, without signing a formal agreement with Russia.  He
stated that the two nations did not need “endless hours of arms control discussions”
and arms control agreements “to reduce our weaponry in a significant way.”  He
offered to “write it down on a piece of paper,” but he indicated that he believed a
handshake would be good enough.5   
President Putin responded by stating that he appreciated the President’s decision
to reduce U.S. nuclear forces and stated that Russia “will try to respond in kind.” He
did not offer a target number for the reductions at that time, but he had stated several
times in previous months, and repeated in December 2001, that Russia planned to
reduce its forces to 1,500 warheads.  He did, however, indicate that he would like to
use the formal arms control process to reduce U.S. and Russian forces.  He
emphasized that the two sides should focus on “reaching a reliable and verifiable
agreement on further reductions of the U.S. and Russian weapons.”6 
The Negotiations
The two sides began discussions on the form and content of a new agreement
in January 2002.  Official comments and press reports from January and February
demonstrate that the two sides’ opening positions contained significant differences.
By the time they concluded the Treaty in May, they had resolved most of their
CRS-3
7 Comments of General Yuri Baluyevskiy.  U.S. Department of Defense.  Under Secretary
Feith Joint Media Availability with Russian First Deputy Chief.  News Transcript.
Washington, January 16, 2002.
8 Beattie, Alan.  "U.S. and Russia Edge Closer to Binding Treaty on N-weapons,"  Financial
Times.  March 30-31, 2002.  See, also Purdhum, Todd S.  "Russia Calls for Binding Pact to
Reduce Nuclear Arsenals,"  New York Times, January 31, 2002; and Slevin, Peter. "U.S.
Russia Divided on Nuclear Arms Cuts,"  Washington Post.  April 28, 2002.  p. 25.
9 Russia Foreign Minister Urges U.S. to Discuss 'Real' Arms Cuts," Dow Jones International
News Service.  February 27, 2002.
10 U.S. Department of Defense.  Special Briefing on the Russian Visit.  News Transcript.
Washington, January 16, 2002.
11 Kralev, Nicholas.  "U.S. Russia Reach Stalemate on Arms,"  Washington Times.  February
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differences over form and content.  In content, the Treaty encodes U.S. proposals.
In form, it reflects Russia’s desire for a formal, “legally binding” document.
Russian Objectives
Russia entered the negotiations seeking a “legally binding document” that would
provide “predictability and transparency” and ensure for the “irreversibility of the
reduction of the nuclear forces.”7  In essence, Russia sought a Treaty that followed
the model used in the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START I and START II),
with similar counting rules, elimination rules, and verification procedures, but a
lower limit on warheads.
After the Bush Administration’s report on the Nuclear Posture Review indicated
that the United States planned to hold warheads removed from deployment in
storage, Russia also insisted that the new Treaty require the elimination of these non-
deployed warheads.8  This would contribute to the “irreversibility” of the limits;
without such a provision, Russia argued the United States might return warheads to
deployed systems and exceed the limits in the Treaty in a relatively short amount of
time.  In addition, Russia wanted the new Treaty to contain a statement noting that
the United States would limit its missile defense program so that defenses would not
threaten the effectiveness of Russia’s offensive forces.9
U.S. Objectives
When the negotiations began, the United States did not plan to conclude a
formal Treaty that would include strict limits on deployed weapons.  It wanted to
maintain the flexibility to size and structure its nuclear forces in response to its own
needs.  The United States preferred a less formal process, such as the exchange of
letters, in which the two nations would state their intentions to reduce their nuclear
forces.  They might conclude a joint declaration to provide for added transparency
measures so that each side could “understand each other’s force structures.”10
Furthermore, the United States had no intention of including restrictions on missile




20, 2002.  p. 9.
12 Landay, Jonathan.  "Rumsfeld Reportedly Resists Firm Limits on Nuclear Arms,"  San
Jose Mercury News.  April 27, 2002.
13 Purdum, Todd S.  "Powell Says U.S. Plans to Work out Binding Arms Pact,"  New York
Times.  February 6, 2002.  p. 1.
14 Landay, Jonathan.  "Rumsfeld Reportedly Resists Firm Limits on Nuclear Arms,"  San
Jose Mercury News.  April 27, 2002.
15 Bleek, Phillip C.  "U.S., Russia Agree to Codify Nuclear Reductions,"  Arms Control
Today.  March 2002.
16 Pincus, Walter.  "Bush Backs an Accord on Nuclear Arms Cuts,"  Washington Post.
March 14, 2002.  p. 19.
Reaching an Agreement
Form of the Agreement.  Press reports indicate that, within the Bush
Administration, Pentagon officials argued strongly against incorporating any limits
on offensive nuclear weapons in a “legally binding” arms control agreement.  They
wanted the United States to be able to reduce or increase its nuclear forces in
response to changes in the international security environment.  Secretary of State
Powell, on the other hand, supported the conclusion of a “legally binding” agreement
because he believed it would help President Putin’s standing with domestic critics
who opposed his policies towards the United States.12
The United States apparently began to move towards Russia’s position in early
February 2002.  In a hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Secretary of State Powell said that the framework “will be something that is legally
binding, and we are examining different ways in which this can happen.”13
According to Secretary Powell, the Administration could complete the agreement as
an executive agreement, whose approval would be subject to a majority vote of both
houses of Congress, or a formal Treaty, which would require the consent of two-
thirds of the Members of the Senate.  Some in the Pentagon, however, continued to
oppose the conclusion of a Treaty limiting strategic offensive nuclear weapons.  They
preferred to limit any “legally binding” provisions to procedures for verifying the
number of deployed warheads.14   In testimony before the Senate Armed Services
Committee in February, Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith said “we see no
reason to try to dictate the size and composition of Russia’s strategic forces by legal
means” and “we do not believe it is prudent to set in stone the level and type of U.S.
nuclear capabilities.”15
President Bush appeared to endorse Secretary Powell’s approach in March.  He
agreed to sign a legally binding agreement, noting that “there needs to be a document
that outlives both of us.” He also stated that the exact form of this “legally binding”
document had not been decided.  But he also endorsed the Pentagon’s emphasis on
verification. He indicated that the agreement should focus on verification, calling it
“the most important thing.”16
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17 Shanker. Thom.  "Senators Insist on Role in Nuclear Arms Deals,"  New York Times.
March 17, 2002.  p. 16.
18 White House, Office of the Press Secretary. President Announces Nuclear Arms Treaty
with Russia.  May 13, 2002.
19 Purdum, Todd S.  "Powell Says U.S. Plans to Work out Binding Arms Pact,"  New York
Times.  February 6, 2002.  p. 1.
20 The number of warheads assigned to ICBMs and SLBMs usually equals the number
carried by each type of system.  Bombers that were not equipped with cruise missiles would
count as one warhead, regardless of the number of weapons they carried.  U.S. bombers
equipped with cruise missiles would count as 10 warheads, but could carry up to 20 cruise
missiles.  Russian bombers equipped with cruise missiles would count as 8 warheads but
could carry up to 16 cruise missiles.
21 According to START, to eliminate ICBMs warheads, the parties had to blow up or
excavate the silo that had held the ICBM, to eliminate SLBM warheads, the parties had to
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In mid-March, Senators Joseph Biden and Jesse Helms sent a letter to the White
House reportedly “demanding” that the Administration submit the eventual
agreement to the Senate as a Treaty.  They noted that “significant obligations by the
United States regarding deployed U.S. strategic nuclear warheads” would “constitute
a Treaty subject to the advice and consent of the Senate.”17  This letter demonstrated
that both parties in the Senate agreed on the need to defend the Senate’s prerogatives
and supported its right to advise and consent on treaties.  The White House did not
accept the Senate’s position immediately.  However, when the President announced,
on May 13, that the United States and Russia had reached an agreement, he stated
that it would be a Treaty.18  One Administration official noted that the Senators’
position had contributed to the change in the U.S. position in discussions with
Russia.19
Content of the Agreement.  The United States and Russia disagreed about
several key issues that would be addressed by the proposed arms control agreement.
These included the definitions and counting rules that the two sides would use to
calculate how many warheads should count under the Treaty’s limits; the disposition
of warheads removed from deployed systems; transparency and verification
provisions; and potential restraints on missile defenses.
Limits and Counting Rules.  The U.S. and Russian differences over how
to count the weapons limited by the new Treaty persisted throughout the negotiations.
Russia proposed that the Treaty use counting rules similar to those in START to
calculate the number of warheads on deployed weapons.20  Under START, the parties
assign a number of warheads to each type of deployed delivery vehicle (ICBMs,
SLBMs, and heavy bombers.)  They then “count” the number of deployed delivery
vehicles and multiply by the “attributed” number of warheads to calculate the total
number of warheads that would count under the Treaty limits.  To remove weapons
from accountability, the parties could either reduce the deployed number of warheads
on missiles, and change the “attributed” number of warheads (a process known as
downloading) or destroy the delivery vehicles according to complex procedures
outlined in the Treaty.21  However, according to some reports, Russia wanted the new
CRS-6
21 (...continued)
remove the launch tubes from ballistic missile submarines, and to eliminate bombers, the
parties had cut off the wings and tails, or convert the bombers so that they could no longer
carry nuclear weapons.
22 Gottemoeller, Rose.  The New U.S.-Russian Nuclear Agreement.  Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace.  Non-Proliferation Project Issue Brief.  Vol. V. No. 9. May 13, 2002.
23 Purdum, Todd S.  "Powell Says U.S. Plans to Work out Binding Arms Pact,"  New York
Times.  February 6, 2002.  p. 1.
24  Slevin, Peter. "U.S. Russia Divided on Nuclear Arms Cuts,"   Washington Post.  April 28,
2002.  p. 25.
Treaty to count the maximum number of warheads that could be carried by a delivery
vehicle, without permitting “downloading” to reduce that number.22  The parties
would have to destroy delivery vehicles to reduce the number of deployed warheads.
The United States did not plan to use the START counting rules and elimination
rules to calculate the number of “operationally deployed” warheads.  Under the U.S.
formula, delivery vehicles that were not deployed with nuclear warheads – either
because they were in overhaul or assigned to non-nuclear missions – would not count
against the limits.  Warheads that had been removed from deployed systems also
would not count under the limits.  The parties would not have to eliminate or destroy
delivery vehicles or stored warheads to reduce the number of warheads that counted
under the agreement.23  
The United States preferred this approach to the START counting rules because
it wanted to maintain the ability to reverse the reductions if conditions warranted.
Administration officials have also noted that the United States should not have to
bear the costs of eliminating launchers and delivery vehicles according to START
elimination rules.24  For example, the Navy plans to convert 4 Trident submarines,
which could carry nearly 800 strategic warheads, to carry conventional weapons; it
does not want to remove the ballistic missile launch tubes from the submarines.
Similarly, the Air Force plans to assign many of its heavy bombers to conventional
units, rather than nuclear units, on a day-to-day basis.  But it does not want to
eliminate the aircrafts’ ability to deliver nuclear weapons because this would be
costly and it could limit aircrafts’ conventional capabilities.  In addition, the United
States plans to have two ballistic missile submarines in overhaul at any one time.
The Bush Administration does not plan to count the warheads on these vessels under
the Treaty’s limits.  If all weapons that could be carried on these systems counted
against the U.S. limits, the United States would retain nearly 4,000 warheads.  Hence,
the United States could not use the START counting rules to calculate warheads,
retain the force structure identified in the Nuclear Posture Review, and reduce its
forces to 1,700-2,200 warheads.
Russia apparently realized that, if it was going to complete an agreement
imposing any limits on U.S. nuclear weapons, it would have to accept the U.S.
refusal to include START counting rules and elimination procedures in the Treaty.
Russia’s acceptance of the U.S. position, which apparently occurred in early May,
cleared the way for the Treaty’s completion.
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29 LaFraniere, Sharon.  "U.S. Russia Report Progress in Nuclear Arms Talks,"  Washington
Post, April 30, 2002.  p. 14.  See also, "U.S. Will Not Destroy Nuclear Warheads, Crouch
Says,"  Aerospace Daily.  May 2, 2002.
30 Safronov, Ivan. "Russian General Staff’s Baluyevskiy Lauds Strategic Offensive
Reductions Treaty," Moscow Kommersant, May 27, 2002.  Translated in FBIS
CEP20020527000221.
Non-Deployed Warheads.  Russia initially insisted that the new Treaty
require the elimination of both delivery vehicles and warheads removed from service.
It argued that the Treaty must provide for “radical, real, and irreversible” cuts in
strategic offensive weapons.25  The United States, on the other hand, pointed out that
previous arms control agreements, such as the START I and START II treaties, had
not required the elimination of warheads removed from deployment.  Both sides
could keep the warheads for testing, spare parts, and possible redeployment.  
In mid-March, Russia appeared to acknowledge this point and soften its
objection to the U.S. position.26 Russia’s Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said that
“for some period of time, those warheads could be stored or shelved,” even though
they would eventually have to be eliminated.27  At the same time, though, Russia
sought to address the problem of the “reload capability” through the Treaty’s
counting rules.  As was noted above, Russia wanted the Treaty to count delivery
vehicles as the maximum number of warheads they could carry and to require the
elimination of delivery vehicles before their warhead could be removed from the
Treaty totals.  These rules would have eliminated concerns about stored warheads;
without the extra delivery vehicles, warheads could not return to the force.  But, as
was noted above, the Bush Administration rejected this position.  It wanted to
maintain the ability to redeploy warheads on short notice.28  By the end of April it
was clear that the United States would insist on retaining its delivery vehicles and
maintaining an unspecified number of warheads in storage.29
In comments published after the Treaty was signed, General Yuriy Baluyevskiy,
the First Deputy Chief of the Russian General Staff, indicated that he believed the
question of warhead storage had not yet been resolved.  He stated that the Treaty
establishes a special bilateral commission on implementation and that the two sides
could use this commission to discuss what to do with the warheads removed from
deployment.30  The United States has not endorsed this view.
Verification.  The United States recognized that, under its proposed limits, the
absence of counting rules and elimination provisions would make it difficult for each
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31 Press reports indicate that the U.S. intelligence community told the Administration that
Russia could be able to deploy a few hundred warheads, above the 2,200 limit, without
detection.  See Jonathan S. Landay.  "U.S. Unable to Confirm Russia’s Compliance with
Weapons Treaty,"  Knight Ridder Newspapers.  December 20, 2004.
32 For example, the U.S. Navy designed a shield to place over its reentry vehicles during
inspections so that inspectors would not see sensitive design information.  These shields had
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warheads, they could not determine if the missile carried fewer than 8 warheads.
33 U.S. Department of Defense.  Special Briefing on the Russian Visit.  News Transcript.
Washington, January 16, 2002.
34 Aldinger, Charles.  "U.S., Russia Discuss Nuclear Cuts,"  Moscow Times.  January 15,
2002.  p. 4.
35 Bleek, Phillip C.  "U.S., Russia Agree to Codify Nuclear Reductions,"  Arms Control
Today.  March 2002.
side to monitor the number of deployed warheads on the other side.31  As was noted
above, under START, the parties count the number of deployed delivery vehicles and
multiply that number by the agreed “counting rule” for each type of system.  They do
not count the actual number of warheads in place on the delivery vehicles.  The
Treaty permits on-site inspections that allow the parties to view reentry vehicles, but
these inspections are designed to confirm that the number of warheads does not
exceed the number allowed for that type of delivery vehicle.  They might not be able
to identify the actual number of warheads on a missile if it were less than the number
in the data base.32 
During the negotiations, the United States suggested that the two nations include
new transparency measures in the agreement.  These could include “more detailed
exchanges of information, visits to particular sites, additional kinds of inspections,
and additional kinds of activities at sites” to enhance confidence and help verify
reductions of “operationally deployed systems.”33  For example, the parties could use
a reentry vehicle inspection system similar to the one in START, where they declare
a number of warheads carried by each type of missile and follow it with inspections
that confirm that the actual number does not exceed the declared number.  Or they
could institute new procedures that would allow inspectors to count the actual
number of warheads on each missile. They might also permit inspections at storage
sites to count weapons held in those locations.34
Russia concurred that the new agreement needed transparency measures and a
verification regime.  Russian officials also agreed that the new Treaty could draw on
the verification regime in START I and include “new transparency and confidence
measures” to monitor nuclear warheads.35  However, reports indicate that the two
nations were unable to agree on which new START measures to employ and which
new measures to include in the agreement.  Russia apparently wanted a formal
system of inspections and data exchanges, while the United States preferred a less
elaborate system that called for cooperation, more generally, instead of specifying
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numbers and types of inspections permitted at specific facilities.36  Although the two
sides were unable to reach agreement on this issue before signing the Treaty at the
Moscow summit, they did agree to continue discussions after signing the Treaty.37
Furthermore, during hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Secretary of State Powell indicated that the two sides would have sufficient
opportunities to collect needed data and information each others forces.  He noted
that the growing level of cooperation between the two, particularly through the Nunn-
Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, provided information and assurances
about the status of nuclear weapons programs.  In addition, the START I Treaty
would remain in force through 2009, and information collected under that Treaty’s
verification regime could also contribute to verification of compliance with the new
Treaty.38
Missile Defense.  During the negotiations, Russia insisted that the new
agreement reflect “the organic interconnection of strategic defensive and offensive
weapons.”39  Russia sought assurances that the U.S. missile defense program would
not be directed at or undermine Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent.40  The United
States refused to include language limiting ballistic missile defenses in the text of the
new agreement.  The U.S. refusal to accept Russia’s view does not necessarily
indicate that the United States plans to deploy missile defenses that could undermine
Russia’s deterrent.  To the contrary, the Clinton and Bush Administrations both
insisted that the U.S. missile defense program was not directed at Russia or its
strategic deterrent.  Both argued that the United States needed defenses to address
emerging threats from other nations who were acquiring ballistic missiles.
Nonetheless, the Bush Administration has indicated that it does not believe that U.S.
missile defenses should be subject to any treaty limits.
The United States and Russia resolved this issue by deferring it to a Joint
Declaration that outlines areas of cooperation that the two nations will pursue in their
new, more cooperative relationship.  This document states that “the United States and
Russia have agreed to implement a number of steps aimed at strengthening
confidence and increasing transparency in the area of missile defense.”41 These steps
will include information exchanges on missile defense programs and tests and
reciprocal visits to observe tests.  They also agreed to explore areas for cooperation
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in the development of missile defenses, such as the expansion of joint exercises and
the possible conduct of joint research and development programs for missile defense
technologies.  Although this agreement did not impose any limits on U.S. missile
defense programs, it could provide Russia with confidence in its understanding of the
goals and capabilities of U.S. missile defense programs.
The Treaty
The text of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, or Treaty of Moscow,
appears in Appendix A at the end of this report.  It contains a preamble that primarily
reviews the relationship between the two nations and their existing arms control
obligations, four articles that outline the obligations they have assumed under the
new Treaty and a fifth article that notes that the parties will register the Treaty at the
United Nations.  The discussion that follows addresses the contents of the four
substantive articles in the treaty.
Article I
Article I contains the only limit in the Treaty, stating that the United States and
Russia will reduce their “strategic nuclear warheads” to between 1,700 and 2,200
warheads by December 31, 2012.  The text does not define “strategic nuclear
warheads” and, therefore, does not indicate whether the parties will count only those
warheads that are “operationally deployed,” all warheads that would count under the
START counting rules, or some other quantity of nuclear warheads.  The text does,
however, refer to the statements made by President Bush in November 2001, when
he announced the U.S. intention to reduce its “operationally deployed warheads” and
President Putin in November and December 2001, when he indicated that Russia
would be willing to reduce its strategic forces to 1,500 warheads.  This reference may
indicate that the United States and Russia could each use their own definition when
counting their number of strategic nuclear warheads.  
The absence of an agreed definition could create ambiguities and confusion
about each side’s progress in reducing their forces.  However, the Article does not
impose any interim limits on forces, or set a pace for the reductions, so ambiguities
that arise during the ten year period should not give rise to questions about overall
compliance with the Treaty.  In addition, in the absence of interim limits, each side
can set its own pace for the reductions, and even stop or reverse them for a period of
time, during the ten-year time frame.  As long as each side can demonstrate that its
forces do not exceed 2,200 strategic nuclear warheads on December 31, 2012, each
will meet its obligations under Article I.
Article I also specifies that each party shall “determine for itself the composition
and structure of its strategic offensive arms.”  It does not limit the number of delivery
vehicles, or impose sublimits on specific types of weapons systems within the overall
total of strategic nuclear warheads.  This differs from past arms control agreements,
where the United States favored limits that would “restructure” Soviet or Russian
strategic forces.  The 1991 START I Treaty contained a sublimit on the number of
warheads that could be carried on ballistic missiles, a sublimit on the number of
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warheads that could be carried on mobile ICBMs, and a requirement for the
elimination of half of the Soviet Union’s 308 heavy ICBMs.  The 1993 START II
Treaty contained a sublimit on SLBM warheads, and in an achievement that was
hailed as a major breakthrough in U.S-Russian arms control, a ban on all multiple-
warhead ICBMs (MIRVed ICBMs).42
The new Treaty clearly indicates, however, that this ban, and all other provisions
in the START II Treaty, will not be implemented.  The preamble and Article II of the
Treaty refer to the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty as START, not START I.
Thus, START II, which never entered into force,43 is evident in its absence.  U.S. and
Russian officials have both noted the Treaty’s demise. Assistant Secretary of Defense
J.D. Crouch has said “I think we have sort of moved beyond START II... setting it
aside and have moved beyond it.”44    In comments made shortly after the Treaty was
signed, Russia’s General Baluyevskiy noted that the START II Treaty “never
operated” and “should be considered dead.”45  One report indicates that the Defense
Minister and Foreign Minister informed the Russian Duma in mid-May that the
Treaty had lapsed.46  Other reports indicate, however, that Russia has not officially
stated that START II will not enter into force.  Some speculate that it may renounce
START II in mid-June, when the United States withdraws from the ABM Treaty, so
that they can link their withdrawal from START II to U.S. withdrawal from the ABM
Treaty.47 Regardless, several Russian commentators have noted that, with the new
Treaty, Russia will no longer be obligated to eliminate all of its MIRVed ICBMs.
Article II
Article II states that the START Treaty (meaning START I) remains in force.
The Treaty does not elaborate on the reason for this observation.  However, in the
Article-by-Article analysis provided to Congress, the Administration states that the
“purpose of this Article is to make clear that the Moscow Treaty and the START
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Treaty are separate.”  The Moscow Treaty will not use the same definitions and
counting rules as START and the provisions in START remain in force, unchanged
by the new provisions in the Moscow Treaty.48  Nevertheless, in the Joint Declaration
signed by Presidents Bush and Putin on May 24, the parties indicate that the
provisions of START “will provide the foundation for providing confidence,
transparency, and predictability in further strategic offensive reductions.”  These
provisions include data exchanges that describe the numbers and locations of
deployed weapons, notifications when deployed weapons are moved to other
locations or when they are scheduled to be eliminated, on-site inspections at
deployment and elimination facilities, and other cooperative measures that help the
parties gain confidence in their estimates of the number of deployed warheads
remaining in each others’ arsenals.
Article III
Article III establishes a Bilateral Implementation Commission, and states that
the parties will meet in this forum at least twice each year.  The Treaty does not
provide any guidelines or procedures for these meetings.  In particular, it does not
indicate whether these meetings will focus solely on monitoring and verification of
the agreed reductions, or whether it will seek to address other issues relevant to the
Treaty.   In its Fact Sheet on the Treaty, the White House states simply that the
commission will meet to discuss issues related to the Treaty.  U.S. officials have
indicated that the commission will work out additional transparency and verification
measures.  But it seems unlikely that the United States will pursue negotiations on
additional limits in the commission.  Russia, however, may prefer a more expansive
role for the commission.  In particular, several Russian officials and analysts have
noted that the commission could address limits on or the elimination of warheads
removed from service.
Article IV
Article IV has three paragraphs.  The first states that the Treaty shall be ratified
in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party.  This ensures that the
Treaty will be “legally binding.”   The second paragraph states that the Treaty will
remain in force until December 31, 2012, after which it could be extended or
replaced by another agreement.  U.S. officials have noted that the Treaty could lapse
if the two sides decided that no further agreement is necessary.49  In theory, then, the
parties might be able to increase their warheads above the 2,200 limit as soon as the
Treaty expires.
The third paragraph in Article IV states that either party may withdraw from the
Treaty on three months’ notice.  This provision differs from the withdrawal clause
in previous treaties in two respects.  First, other Treaties, such as the ABM Treaty,
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START I, and START II, required six months notice before a party could withdraw.
Second, these Treaties stated that a party could withdraw from the Treaty if
“extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its
supreme interests.”  The new Treaty does not have a similar provision.  A party can
withdraw for any reason it chooses, without justifying its actions by citing
“extraordinary events [that] have jeopardized its supreme interests.”
Reports indicate that during the negotiations, the United States proposed that the
Treaty include a withdrawal period of only 45 days.  It also sought a provision that
would have allowed either side to exceed the limits in the Treaty for a short period
of time, without withdrawing, if “international geostrategic circumstances”
warranted.50  These proposals reflected the U.S. interest in maintaining a maximum
amount of flexibility when reducing its forces.  But they were not needed in the final
draft.  Because the Treaty does not contain any interim limits or schedule for
reductions, either party can exceed the limits in the Treaty at any time leading up to
December 31, 2012.
Force Structures Under the Treaty of Moscow
The tables in this section display actual U.S. and Russian force structures in
place in January 2002, after the two nations completed implementation of the
START I Treaty.  They also show forces that would have been consistent with the
limits in the START II Treaty and forces that will be consistent with the limits in the
Treaty of Moscow.  Although the parties will not implement START II, the report
includes these potential forces for comparison with the reductions that might occur
under the new Treaty.
U.S. Force Structure
In 2001, when the United States completed its implementation of START I, U.S.
strategic nuclear forces included 500 Minuteman III ICBMs equipped with between
one and 3 warheads each, 50 10-warhead Peackeeper ICBMs, 18 Trident submarines
equipped with 24 8-warhead ballistic missiles, 94 B-52 H bombers, 91 B-1 bombers,
and 21 B-2 bombers.  The B-52 H bombers can be equipped with up to 20 long-range
nuclear-armed cruise missiles, but they count as only 10 warheads under START’s
counting rules.  The B-1 bombers are no longer equipped to conduct nuclear
missions, but each counts as one warhead under START.  B-2 bombers can carry up
to 16 gravity bombs, but each also counts as only one warhead under START.  As
Table 1 shows, this force “counts” as 5,952 warheads under the START I limit of
6,000 warheads.  If all the weapons that could be deployed on B-52 and B-2 bombers
were included, this force would count as 7,116 warheads.
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Table 1.  U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces
START I START II Treaty of Moscow
Launchers Warheads Launchers Warheads Launchers Warheads
ICBMs 550 1,444 500 500 500 500
SLBMs 432 3,456 336 1,680 336 864
Bombers 206 1,052 97 1,276 97 836
Total 1,188 5,952 933 3,456 933 2,200
In 1994, as a part of the first nuclear posture review, the United States identified
the force structure that it would deploy under the START II Treaty.  This force
included 500 single-warhead Minuteman III missiles, 14 Trident submarines
equipped with 24 5-warhead SLBMs, 76 B-52 bombers, and 21 B-2 bombers.  The
B-52 bombers would carry 8, 12, or 20 cruise missiles, and count as the number they
were equipped to carry.  The B-2 bombers would carry and count as 16 gravity
bombs.  Hence, the United States would eliminate 4 Trident submarines and 50
Peacekeeper missiles and remove warheads from Minuteman and Trident missiles
to reduce to the START II limit of 3,500 warheads.
The Bush Administration does not plan to eliminate any of the delivery vehicles
that the United States would have retained under the START II Treaty.  To reduce
that force from 3,500 to 2,200, permitted by the Moscow Treaty,, it will remove
warheads from deployed ICBMs and SLBMs. Consequently, the Administration
plans to retain all 500 Minuteman III missiles, with one warhead on each missile and
14 Trident submarines, with perhaps 3 warheads on each missile.  However, it will
only count the warheads on 12 submarines under the Treaty limits because it plans
to keep two submarines in overhaul at any given time.  Finally, the Administration
plans to retain 76 B-52 bombers and 21 B-1 bombers.  However, because many of
these bombers will be assigned to conventional units on a day-to-day basis, it does
not plan to count the weapons that could be carried on all of these aircraft under the
Treaty limits.  Table 1, above, assumes that approximately 500 cruise missiles for the
B-52 bombers will count under the Treaty limits.
Russia’s Force Structure
After implementing START I, Russian strategic nuclear forces included 150 10-
warhead SS-18 ICBMs, 150 6-warhead SS-19 ICBMs, 36 10-warhead SS-24 ICBMs,
and 390 single warheads ICBMs (360 SS-25s and 30 SS-27s).  Russia also has 20
ballistic missile submarines, equipped with a number of different types of missiles.
Russia’s bomber fleet consists of 78 aircraft – 15 Blackjack bombers and 63 Bear H
bombers.  Under START rules, each of these counts as 8 warheads, but they can be
equipped to carry up to 16 cruise missiles.  This force counts as 5,518 warheads
under the START I Treaty.
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Russia never publicly identified a force structure that it would have deployed
under START II.  However, START II would have required the elimination of all SS-
18 and SS-24 ICBMs. Russia could have retained 105 SS-19 ICBMs, but each
missile could carry only one warhead.  It also might have retained between 400 and
700 single warhead ICBMs.  This number would depend on Russia’s ability to
produce new SS-27 ICBMs.  It had planned to produce up to 30 of these missiles per
year, but, thus far, has succeeded in adding fewer than 10 per year to its deployed
forces.  Russia’s submarine fleet might have consisted of as many as 13 submarines
(5 Typhoons and 8 Delta IVs), or, because the Typhoon submarines are in need of
significant repairs, as few as 6 Delta IVs.  The bomber fleet could have remained at
the current level of 78 aircraft, but each bomber might carry, and count as, 12
warheads. 
Table 2.  Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces
START I START II Treaty of Moscow
Launchers Warheads Launchers Warheads Launchers Warheads
ICBMs 726 3,150 805 805 300 900
SLBMs 322 1,744 228 1,512 96 384
Bombers 78 624 78 936 65 780
Total 1,136 5,518 1,111 3,253 461 2,064
As Table 2 shows, Russia could only reach the START II limits of 3,000-3,500
warheads if it deployed over 800 ICBMs, 13 ballistic missile submarines, and 78
aircraft.  Most analysts believe that Russia would not have the economic resources
to support this force.  This problem underlined Russia’s interest in concluding a new
agreement that would limit each side to only 1,500 warheads.
Most analysts agree that Russia’s strategic nuclear forces will decline sharply
during the next 10 years, as it retires aging systems and produces only small numbers
of new missiles.  However, in the absence of the START II ban on MIRVed ICBMs,
Russia might be able to deploy its new SS-27 ICBM with 3 warheads, instead of one.
If Russia produced 30 of these missiles each year, and deployed each with 3
warheads, and if it retained the existing 6 Delta IV submarines and reduced its
bomber fleet to 65 aircraft, it could retain a force of 2,064 warheads.  This force is
displayed on Table 2, above.  If, on the other hand, it produced 10 missiles per year
and equipped each with a single warhead, then Russia’s force would include fewer
than 500 ICBM warheads, and a total of only 1,624 warheads.
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Assessing the Outcome
Russia’s Objectives
As was noted above, Russia entered the negotiations in search of a “legally
binding” treaty that would make “radical, real, and irreversible” reductions in U.S.
and Russian strategic nuclear weapons.51  It succeeded in achieving the first of these
two objectives.  Russian officials and other Russian analysts have stated that this
outcome represents a major success for Russian diplomacy.52  Where the United
States initially wanted simply to exchange letters or issue a Joint Declaration, Russia
convinced it to negotiate and sign a formal arms control treaty.  In doing so, these
officials argue, Russia can be assured that, as Russia reduces its nuclear forces in
response to economic pressures, the United States will also reduce its nuclear forces
so that the two retain a rough nuclear parity.  Furthermore, the Treaty ensures that the
U.S. commitment to reduce its forces will continue to exist after the Bush
Administration leaves office.
More important, according to Russian officials, the signing of a Treaty indicates
that the United States and Russia remain equal partners in the arms control process,
even though Russia can no longer claim to be a military or economic equal of the
United States.53   Many analysts believe that retaining this “seat at the table” was a
key objective for President Putin because it demonstrated to his critics at home that
Russia will benefit from his new, more accommodating policies towards the United
States and the West.
Russia did not succeed in convincing the United States to adopt the START I
counting rules or to eliminate excess delivery vehicles or warheads when
implementing the Treaty.  It also did not convince the United States to include in the
Treaty a provision stating that U.S. missile defenses would not undermine Russia’s
offensive deterrent.  Russian officials recognize that they were unable to win these
points in the negotiations, but they argue that they could still achieve their objectives.
As was noted above, General Baluyevskiy has argued that the issue of how to limit
and eliminate non-deployed warheads could be on the agenda for the Treaty’s
bilateral commission (although discussions on this issue have not, to date, occurred).
Furthermore, even though the Treaty does not contain a direct reference to missile
defenses, Russian officials have claimed that Russia achieved its objective of linking
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offenses and defenses by including in the Treaty’s preamble a reference to the Bush-
Putin statement from the Genoa summit, where they agreed to hold “consultations
on the interrelated subjects of offensive and defensive systems (emphasis added).”54
And the Joint Declaration, signed at the same time as the Treaty of Moscow, provides
Russia its assurances on the scope and intent of U.S. missile defenses by calling for
expanded information exchanges and cooperation.
U.S. Objectives
When the United States entered the negotiations, it sought to avoid signing a
formal arms control treaty and to maintain unrestricted flexibility in sizing and
structuring its nuclear forces.  It did not want any limits on its delivery vehicles or its
stockpiled warheads and it did not want any limits on U.S. missile defenses.  It
succeeded in achieving these last objectives, but did not succeed in avoiding a formal
arms control treaty.  The Bush Administration reportedly acquiesced to Russia’s
demands for a formal Treaty for three reasons.  First, the Administration ensured, by
standing firm on U.S. negotiating positions, that the Treaty would reflect the U.S.
objective of maintaining force structure flexibility. The form of the document
ultimately became unimportant when it was clear that the substance would not
undermine current U.S. plans.  Second, key U.S. Senators had pressured the
Administration to conclude a Treaty.
Third, the U.S. concession on signing a Treaty could strengthen Putin’s ability
to cooperate with the United States in other areas of security policy.  Many in Russia
have criticized Putin for supporting the United States in its war on terrorism and
allowing U.S. troops access to bases on former Soviet territory.  By signing the
Treaty, the Administration, in essence, rewarded Putin for his cooperation and
allowed him to answer his critics with his achievement.
 
Response and Reaction
Many analysts and observers in the United States and Russia have praised the
Treaty of Moscow as a “useful first step” in the process of reducing U.S. and Russian
nuclear weapons.  They are particularly appreciative of the fact that the agreement is
a formal treaty – it carries the weight of law since it was reviewed and approved by
the nations’ legislative bodies and it will remain in force beyond the terms of
President Bush and President Putin.  Some Russian commentators have also noted
that, as a Treaty, the document will carry more weight in the international political
community, demonstrating that the United States and Russia remain committed to
nuclear disarmament, as they promised in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
Some, in both the United States and Russia, have criticized the absence of
provisions that would require the elimination of delivery vehicles or warheads.  Some
in Russia argue that this would place Russia at a disadvantage, because Russia will
have to eliminate its weapons systems due to a lack of funding, but the United States
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will retain a “redeployment potential” with both extra delivery capacity and extra
warheads.55  Others, in both the United States and Russia, argue that the retention of
excess warheads in storage might create potential new risks because the warheads
could be sold to or stolen by terrorist organizations.56
In Russia, some have praised the Treaty because it signals the end of the START
II Treaty and its ban on MIRVed ICBMs.  They note that, under the new agreement,
Russia will be able to structure its forces as it sees fit.  In particular, it could retain
aging MIRVed ICBMs, such as the SS-24 or it could deploy the new SS-27 with
multiple warheads.57  In the United States, however, critics have argued that the
demise of the ban on MIRVed ICBMs could undermine confidence and stability.
They note that multiple warhead missiles will still be an attractive target and, fearing
that it might lose these weapons in an attack, Russia could still keep them at a high
state of alert.  This could increase the chance of an inadvertent launch of nuclear
weapons in response to false or ambiguous information.58  Furthermore, some have
argued that the arms control opponents in the United States could use deployment of
new MIRVed ICBMs in Russia as a reason to add warheads to the U.S. force, which
could undermine the agreement and lead to its collapse.
Finally, many analysts and the United States and Russia have noted that the new
Treaty does nothing to count, contain, or reduce non-strategic nuclear weapons – the
shorter range missiles and artillery.  Reports indicate that Russia may have more than
12,000 of these weapons and some analysts argue they are housed in storage areas
that might be at risk for loss through  theft or attack.  Analysts also note that these
weapons have played a greater role in Russia’s national security policy in recent
years, and that Russia might use these weapons in a conflict if it lacked the necessary
conventional forces.  In response to concerns about Russia’s nonstrategic nuclear
weapons, the Bush Administration  noted that the subject would be on the agenda for
discussion between the two countries.59  The summit did not address this issue in its
public documents.  But Secretaries Powell and Rumsfeld both noted, during their
testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that the issue of
nonstrategic nuclear weapons was likely to be high on the agenda of the new
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Consultative Group for Strategic Stability, which was established in the summit’s
Joint Declaration.  Discussions on this issue, have not, however, yet occurred.
The Road Ahead
As is stated in Article IV, the Treaty must be ratified “in accordance with the
constitutional procedures” of each nation before it can enter into force.  In Russia, a
majority of both houses of Parliament, the Duma and the Federation Council, must
vote to approve a Federal Law on Ratification.  In the United States, two-thirds of the
Members in the Senate must vote to approve a Resolution of Ratification.  This has
been a relatively simple matter, because legislators in both nations have praised the
Treaty and no one has voiced opposition to its approval.  However, both nations’
legislatures have shown a reluctance in recent years to approve arms control
agreements without significant debate and, on occasion, significant reservations.  In
addition, the Russian Duma has often linked its consideration of arms control treaties
to its objections on other aspects of U.S. policy.
In 1999, the U.S. Senate failed to offer its advice and consent to ratification of
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.  It approved the Chemical Weapons Convention
in 1997, but included 28 conditions in its Resolution of Ratification.  The Clinton
Administration never submitted several 1997 agreements related to the 1972 ABM
Treaty, in part because it feared the Senate would reject these agreements and attack
the continued viability of the ABM Treaty.  The Treaty of Moscow has not
encountered such significant opposition in the Senate, even with the change to
Republican leadership.  Republican Members have praised the Treaty because it does
not restrict U.S. flexibility in structuring its forces. Democrats have also praised the
Treaty because it demonstrates a continuing U.S. commitment to the arms control
process and because it may represent a first step on a path to deeper nuclear weapons
reductions.
The Senate could, nonetheless, have amended the Treaty or added conditions to
its Resolution of Ratification to address perceived weaknesses.60  The Senate Foreign
Relations Committee did not recommend any amendments to the Treaty.  The Senate
Foreign Relations Committee did, however, include reservations and conditions in
the Resolution of Ratification that it approved, by a vote of 19-0, on February 5,
2003. In response to Members’ concerns about the absence of timelines and interim
limits in the Treaty, the Resolution requires that the President report to Congress each
year on the progress that the United States and Russia have made in reducing their
forces to the Treaty’s limits.  The Resolution also contains non-binding declarations
that require, among other things, that the United States reduce its forces as quickly
as possible and that it provide Russia with assistance in securing its non-strategic
nuclear weapons. would only affect U.S. policy.  The full Senate approved the
Resolution of Ratification, by a vote of 95-0 on March 6, 2003, with these
reservations and declarations included.  Some Senators proposed amendments to the
Resolution of Ratification, but these were all defeated after the Chairman and
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Ranking Member, Senators Lugar and Biden, made it clear that they would not
support any amendments to the Treaty or the Resolution of Ratification during the
debate on the floor of the Senate.  The Text of the Resolution of Ratification appears
in Appendix B, at the end of this report.
The Russian Duma has also demonstrated its independence on arms control
Treaties in recent years.  It delayed its vote on the START II Treaty for seven years,
questioning both the foreign policies of President Yeltsin and several key elements
of the Treaty.61 When it did approve the Treaty, it included a condition in its Federal
Law on Ratification that stated Russia would not exchange the instruments of
ratification, and allow the Treaty to enter into force, until the United States approved
several 1997 agreements related to the ABM Treaty.  Since the Senate never
addressed or approved these agreements, START II could not enter into force.  
The Duma could have included conditions in its approval of the new Treaty, as
well. It did raise questions about Russia’s financing and support for its strategic
nuclear forces.  The Duma also delayed its debate and vote on the Treaty in March
2003, after the United States began its military operation in Iraq.  However, most
analysts agreed that neither the Duma nor the Federation Council was likely to
challenge President Putin by threatening to reject the Treaty.  President Putin has
much broader and stronger support in the Duma than President Yeltsin had.
Although the leader of the Communist Party has denounced the Treaty as a betrayal
of Russian interests, most Members who commented praised the President for
convincing the United States to sign a “legally binding” Treaty.  In addition, Russian
officials have established a Working Group, which includes Members of both the
Duma and the Federation Council, to review the Treaty and meet with government
experts.  This Working Group has prepared the draft Federal Law on Ratification for
the Treaty.62  The Duma approved the Federal Law on Ratification on May 14, 2003.
President Bush and President Putin may exchange the instruments of ratification
for this Treaty when they meet in Russia in June 2003.  The Treaty will then enter
into force.
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Appendix A: Text of Strategic Offensive Reductions
Treaty
 
The United States of America and the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as
the Parties, 
Embarking upon the path of new relations for a new century and committed to the
goal of strengthening their relationship through cooperation and friendship, 
Believing that new global challenges and threats require the building of a
qualitatively new foundation for strategic relations between the Parties, 
Desiring to establish a genuine partnership based on the principles of mutual security,
cooperation, trust, openness, and predictability, 
Committed to implementing significant reductions in strategic offensive arms, 
Proceeding from the Joint Statements by the President of the United States of
America and the President of the Russian Federation on Strategic Issues of July 22,
2001 in Genoa and on a New Relationship between the United States and Russia of
November 13, 2001 in Washington, 
Mindful of their obligations under the Treaty Between the United States of America
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the START
Treaty, 
Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968, and 
Convinced that this Treaty will help to establish more favorable conditions for
actively promoting security and cooperation, and enhancing international stability,
Have agreed as follows: 
Article I 
Each Party shall reduce and limit strategic nuclear warheads, as stated by the
President of the United States of America on November 13, 2001 and as stated by the
President of the Russian Federation on November 13, 2001 and December 13, 2001
respectively, so that by December 31, 2012 the aggregate number of such warheads
does not exceed 1700-2200 for each Party. Each Party shall determine for itself the
composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms, based on the established
aggregate limit for the number of such warheads. 
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Article II
The Parties agree that the START Treaty remains in force in accordance with its
terms. 
Article III 
For purposes of implementing this Treaty, the Parties shall hold meetings at least
twice a year of a Bilateral Implementation Commission. 
Article IV 
1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional
procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the
exchange of instruments of ratification. 
2. This Treaty shall remain in force until December 31, 2012 and may be extended
by agreement of the Parties or superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement. 
3. Each Party, in exercising its national sovereignty, may withdraw from this Treaty
upon three months written notice to the other Party. 
Article V 
This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United
Nations. 
Done at Moscow on May 24, 2002, in two copies, each in the English and Russian
languages, both texts being equally authentic. 
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Appendix B: Resolution of Ratification for the
Treaty of Moscow
Resolved, (two thirds of the Senators present concurring therein), 
SECTION 1. SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS
AND DECLARATIONS. 
The Senate advises and consents to the ratification of the Treaty Between the
United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive
Reductions (T. Doc. 107-8, in this resolution referred to as the ``Moscow Treaty'' or
``Treaty''), subject to the conditions in section 2 and declarations in section 3. 
SEC. 2. CONDITIONS. 
The advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification of the Moscow Treaty
is subject to the following conditions, which shall be binding on the President: 
(1) REPORT ON THE ROLE OF COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION
AND NONPROLIFERATION ASSISTANCE. Recognizing that implementation of
the Moscow Treaty is the sole responsibility of each party, not later than 60 days after
the exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty, and annually thereafter on
February 15, the President shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and
the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate a report and recommendations on
how United States Cooperative Threat Reduction assistance to the Russian
Federation can best contribute to enabling the Russian Federation to implement the
Treaty efficiently and maintain the security and accurate accounting of its nuclear
weapons and weapons-usable components and material in the current year. The report
shall be submitted in both unclassified and, as necessary, classified form. (2) Annual
implementation report. Not later than 60 days after exchange of instruments of
ratification of the Treaty, and annually thereafter on April 15, the President shall
submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed
Services of the Senate a report on implementation of the Treaty by the United States
and the Russian Federation. This report shall be submitted in both unclassified and,
as necessary, classified form and shall include 
(A) a listing of strategic nuclear weapons force levels of the United States,
and a best estimate of the strategic nuclear weapons force levels of the Russian
Federation, as of December 31 of the preceding calendar year;  
(B) a detailed description, to the extent possible, of strategic offensive
reductions planned by each party for the current calendar year; 
(C) to the extent possible, the plans of each party for achieving by
December 31, 2012, the strategic offensive reductions required by Article I of the
Treaty; 
(D) measures, including any verification or transparency measures, that
have been taken or have been proposed by a party to assure each party of the other
party's continued intent and ability to achieve by December 31, 2012, the strategic
offensive reductions required by Article I of the Treaty; 
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(E) information relevant to implementation of this Treaty that has been
learned as a result of Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) verification
measures, and the status of consideration of extending the START verification
regime beyond December 2009; 
(F) any information, insufficiency of information, or other situation that
may call into question the intent or the ability of either party to achieve by December
31, 2012, the strategic offensive reductions required by Article I of the Treaty; and
(G) any actions that have been taken or have been proposed by a party to
address concerns listed pursuant to subparagraph (F) or to improve the
implementation and effectiveness of the Treaty. 
SEC. 3. DECLARATIONS. 
The advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification of the Moscow Treaty
is subject to the following declarations, which express the intent of the Senate: 
(1) TREATY INTERPRETATION. The Senate reaffirms condition (8) of the
resolution of ratification of the Document Agreed Among the States Parties to the
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) of November 19, 1990
(adopted at Vienna on May 31, 1996), approved by the Senate on May 14, 1997,
relating to condition (1) of the resolution of ratification of the Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, approved by the Senate on May 27, 1988. 
(2) FURTHER STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS. The Senate encourages
the President to continue strategic offensive reductions to the lowest possible levels
consistent with national security requirements and alliance obligations of the United
States. 
(3) BILATERAL IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES. The Senate expects the
executive branch of the Government to offer regular briefings, including
consultations before meetings of the Bilateral Implementation Commission, to the
Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the
Senate on any implementation issues related to the Moscow Treaty. Such briefings
shall include a description of all efforts by the United States in bilateral forums and
through diplomatic channels with the Russian Federation to resolve any such issues
and shall include a description of 
(A) the issues raised at the Bilateral Implementation Commission, within
30 days after such meetings; 
(B) any issues related to implementation of this Treaty that the United
States is pursuing in other channels, including the Consultative Group for Strategic
Security established pursuant to the Joint Declaration of May 24, 2002, by the
Presidents of the United States and the Russian Federation; and 
(C) any Presidential determination with respect to issues described in
subparagraphs (A) and (B). 
(4) NONSTRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS. Recognizing the difficulty the
United States has faced in ascertaining with confidence the number of nonstrategic
nuclear weapons maintained by the Russian Federation and the security of those
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weapons, the Senate urges the President to engage the Russian Federation with the
objectives of  
(A) establishing cooperative measures to give each party to the Treaty
improved confidence regarding the accurate accounting and security of nonstrategic
nuclear weapons maintained by the other party; and 
(B) providing United States or other international assistance to help the
Russian Federation ensure the accurate accounting and security of its nonstrategic
nuclear weapons. 
(5) ACHIEVING REDUCTIONS. Recognizing the transformed relationship
between the United States and the Russian Federation and the significantly decreased
threat posed to the United States by the Russian Federation's strategic nuclear arsenal,
the Senate encourages the President to accelerate United States strategic force
reductions, to the extent feasible and consistent with United States national security
requirements and alliance obligations, in order that the reductions required by Article
I of the Treaty may be achieved prior to December 31, 2012. 
(6) CONSULTATIONS. Given the Senate's continuing interest in this Treaty
and in continuing strategic offensive reductions to the lowest possible levels
consistent with national security requirements and alliance obligations of the United
States, the Senate urges the President to consult with the Senate prior to taking
actions relevant to paragraphs 2 or 3 of Article IV of the Treaty. 
